includes advancing a distinctive appreciation of thesocial content ofcapital marketsand investmentbanking,buildingcriticallyonHilferding's1910analysis.
Onthesebasesthepaperarguesthatcontemporarybankingcentresononehandon mutually beneficial, arms-length relationships with corporations based on investment banking services. At the same time, banks have developed historically new, exploitative modes of appropriation from the independently secured income of wage earners. Those havedevelopedin thepoliticalclimatecreatedbysignificantclass-struggledefeatssuffered by the working-class movement, in which the provision of a growing share of necessary goodsandservicesbecameofremainedprivate.
Privateprovisionofeducation,housing,andhealthmakeaccessto moneyagrowing requirement forpresent andfutureconsumption. Against a setting ofstagnant real wages and rising income inequality, this has pushed wage earners onto financial markets as an integral part of their basic reproduction. Banks mediate access to housing, durable consumergoods, education, and increasinglyhealthcare,though insurance, mortgageand other individual loans, drawing profits from wage income that are increasingly central to theiroperations.
The gradual privatisationofpension provision has also helpedbanksdevelopother avenues of appropriation founded on wage income. Pension and other investment funds havegeneratedrising feeincomesforbanks.Theassociatedunprecedentedmoneyinflows into capital markets have also enhanced the scope for various corporate "financial engineering" measures in which banks play a central role. In contrast to therelationship between corporations and banks, these activities bear the mark of the profound social inequalitybetweenwageearnersseekingtosecurefutureconsumptionandbanksseekingto maximiseprofits,asglaringandarguablysystematicdisadvantagestotheformer.Itmaybe usefullyunderstoodaspossessinganexploitativecontent.
Therestofthepaperproceedsasfollows.Section2laysoutthebroadchangesto the compositionandcharacterofbanking incomesanddiscussestheregulatory, technological and capital-market setting that has shaped them. Section 3 turns to the changes to conventional lending and money-dealing activitiesof banks. Sections4 and5considerthe significanceandsocialcontentoffinancialmarketmediationfunctionsperformedbybanks. Section4 focuses on fund management, derivative assets and proprietarygains. Section 5 offersdistinctiveMarxistanalyticalelementsforanapproachtothesocialcontentofcapital markets and traditional investment banking functions. Section 6offers abrief concluding discussion.
2.NewSourcesandTypesofBankIncome
Anumberofstudieshavedocumentedanddiscussedthechangesinbankingoverthe past threedecades. 2 The broad empirical contours highlighted by those studies are clear. Theincomebanksreceivefrominterest-ratespreadshassteadilydiminishedinimportance. Households have shifted their assets away from bank deposits in favour of various investmentfunds,andtheimportanceofbanklendingtoenterpriseshasfallensignificantly. Banks haverespondedbydeveloping newrevenuestreams infees,commissionsandother non-interest gains from activities associated with "financial market mediation". These involve facilitating the participation of others in financial markets through investment banking servicesto corporations, brokerageand,increasingly,throughthemanagement of investment, mutual, pension and insurance funds for retail investors. Banks have also increasedlendingtoindividualsthroughconsumptionloansandmortgages.
These trends are evident in macro-level data for advanced economies. CalculatedfromOECDBankIncomeStatementandBalanceSheetStatistics Bank lending has correspondingly declined in importance. It has also changed in composition,shiftingfrom lendingto real sectorfirmstowardsindividualconsumptionand mortgageloans.InGermany, non-mortgagebanklending tonon-banksdeclinedfrom68.2 percent of GDP in 1972 to 26.8 percent in 2003. In Britain, resident banks' lending to individuals rose from 11.6 to 40.7 percent of total lending between 1976 and 2006, with lending to financial intermediaries also rising from 20.3 to 32.4 percent. In the US, bank lending to commercial and industrial enterprises fell from 10.8 to 8.2 percent of GDP. Although belated, the corresponding fall in Japan has been sudden, with bank lending to non-financial enterprisesmoving from61percent ofGDPattheendof1997to 39.2percent intheautumnof2007. 4
2.1TheRiseoftheInstitutionalInvestor
A number of interrelated processes and innovations have created the context for thesechanges. Technical innovation hasbeen instrumental in theorientation of banks to individualcredit.Creditscoringmethodshavemademassretaillendingpossiblebyyielding quantitative (and problematic) estimates of the creditworthiness of individual borrowers, andoflarge,securitisedpoolsofloanstoindividuals.Technologicalchangehasalsocreated newmoney-dealingservices,suchasATMsandebanking,whosecostsbanksappeartohave beenpassedontoretaildepositors. 5 Statepolicyinfavouroffinancialliberalization,andsecularchangesin thefinancial behaviourofcorporationsandhouseholds,havebeenparticularlyimportant.Mostdirectly, therelaxationandrepealofGlass-Steagall restrictionsintheUS,andtheacceptanceofthe provision of various insurance services by banks in Europe have widened the scope for commercialbankinterventionintocapitalmarkets.
More fundamentally, the rising importance of corporations' own retained earnings, andthegradualprivatisationofpensionprovisionhavehadamajorimpactonbothsidesof capital markets. On the demand side, increased volumes of money have sought to buy securities.Onthesupplyside,thescopeforcapitalgainsgeneratedfromvarious"financial engineering" measures has increased. And across both sides, the scope for fee and other incomefromfinancialmarketmediationhasbeengreatlyenhanced.
As statepensions have been eroded across theOECD countries, trillions ofdollars enteredcapitalmarketsintheformofvariousretirement-relatedinvestmentfunds.Thelate 1970s and early 1980s saw a raft of measures that both degraded public pensions and encouraged private retirement savings in the US. Access to tax sheltered Individual Retirement Accounts was steadily broadened in the 1970s, and 401(k) plans were implemented in the early 1980s. The 1981-83 Greenspan Commission on Social Security endorsed these measures and led the charge against the quality of public pensions by imposingincometaxonbenefitsoveraverylowlevel. 6 Asaresult,theholdingsofpension andmutualfundsbyUShouseholdsexploded, from apost-waraveragearound40percent ofGDPtothe120-140percentaverageofthelasttenyears.
CalculatedfromFlowofFundsoftheUnitedStates,BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem Japanese households also accumulated significant financial assets over the same period,includingahighlevelofinsurancereserves,whichincludepensionsavings 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
2.2ChangesinCorporateFinancialBehaviour
The new funds also helped create new "sell-side" revenues for banks by fueling a tremendousincreaseincapital market issuance,particularlyintheUS. TheissuanceofUS corporateliabilities,notablybonds, grewintandem withnewmoneyinflows,risingfroma post-waraverageofaroundfourpercentofGDPtowellover30percentin2001. 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 
Figure2-USCorporateCapitalRaisedtoGDP,1960-2001
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CalculatedfromFlowofFundsoftheUnitedStates,BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem In words, the increased corporate bond borrowing over this period appears to be closely related to the withdrawal of equity, which typically takes the form of "financial engineering" operations like share buybacks, private equity purchases, mergers and acquisitions. These operations have become increasingly important to the relationship of non-financial corporationsandfinancial markets,at least inthe US. Asdiscussedin detail below, the potential capital gains achieved by such operations are greatly enhanced in a setting ofincreasing volumes ofmoneyentering capital markets. Commercial banks have 1953Q1 1958Q1 1963Q1 1968Q1 1973Q1 1978Q1 1983Q1 1988Q1 1993Q1 1998Q1 2003Q12008Q1 
Figure3-USNonfinancialCorportations'LiabilityFlowstoGDP,1952Q1-2008Q4
PauloLdosSantos-OntheContentofBankinginContemporaryCapitalism9 developed significant revenuestreamsby managing, advising, underwriting and financing thesefinancialoperations.
Throughallthesechanges,bankshavebeenablenotonlytomaintain,butactuallyto increasethesignificanceoftheirprofitsintheadvancedeconomies. 
Table3 BankProfitsasPercentageofGDP
3.EconomicRelationsofBankLendingandMoney-Dealing
Changesinbankingoperationsandsocialrelationshaveincludedimportant changes in bank lendingand money dealing functions. Marxist political economy has long offered compellingaccountsofthenatureandsocialcontentofthesebankingactivities. 10 Thosecan be readily extended to offer insights into the particular forms these activities take in contemporarybanking: lendingto individuals, and risingbanking andcredit-card account feespaidbyretailbankclients.
Through both channels, banks have come to mediate increasing proportions of consumption, drawing revenue from the independently secured wage income of their clients.Assuch,theyconstitutehistoricallynovelavenuesforthefinancialexpropriationof wageearners. Thissection tackles these changesin bank behaviour,offering an empirical and analytical discussion of the importance and distinct social content of these new channelsofappropriation.
3.1LendingtoEnterprises
Classical Marxist analysis of bank lending is founded on the distinctive concept of interest-bearing (or loanable) capital. Interest-bearing capital is a peculiar type of capital that is distinct from industrial and commercial capital. It originates from idle pools of moneycapitalthatappearinthefirstinstanceoverthecourseofthecircuitofindustrialand merchantcapital.Suchpoolsaremobilisedandtransformedintoloanablemoneycapitalby thecredit system, whichchannelsit backinto circulation intheformofloansto capitalist enterprises. 11 Tradingininterest-bearingcapitalinvolvescreditrelations,thatis,theadvance of value against a promise of repayment with interest. In this light, banks are capitalist enterprises that specialize in all aspects of dealing in interest-bearing capital, accruing revenuesfromthedifferenceinthepricepaidfordepositsandthatpaidonloans.
Loanablemoneycapital receivesnot profits but repayments with interest. To Marx 1894, 12 theleveloftherateofinterestcontainsanelementofirrationality:Itistheprice--or expressionofvalueinmoney--ofafutureflowofmoney.Italsorevealsnounderlyingsocioeconomicrelationshiporinherent material aspect ofsocial reproduction,not least because itisnotthepriceofaproducedcommodity.Therateofreturnonloanablemoneycapitalis determined simply through the interaction of supply and demand. To Marx, competition between buyers andsellers, however, tends to maintain therateofinterest between zero andtherateofprofit duringordinaryperiods.Theirrelativedetachment from thematerial realities of production makes relations defined over loanable money capital highly susceptibletotheinfluenceofbroaderpatternsofsocio-politicalpower. 13 Inlendingtocapitalistenterprises,thepaymentofinterestisgenerallyashareofthe profit generated by capital applied to production or circulation of commodities. At the broadest level, the systematic basis for the payment of interest in this context is the increased turnover of total capital achieved by the mobilisation of idle money and its application to functioning circuits of capital through lending. More concretely, individual firms will be able to increase the returns on their own capital by leveraging it through borrowing,solongasthereturnonappliedcapitalexceedstherateofinterest.Finally,given thatdebtholdersmustbepaidinordertoavoidbankruptcy,highlevelsofdebtmaybeused asalevertokeepenterprisecostsdown,mostoftenbyloweringorkeepingdowntotalwage payments. 14 Undernormalconditions,loanablemoneycapitaladvancedtoacapitalistenterprise will help generate the source of its own repayment with interest, by circulating in the borrower's circuit and expanding through the appropriation of surplus value. Finally, the relationship between capitalist lender and borrower is at this level of abstraction one between social equals who bothenterthe transaction on the basis of a profit-maximising calculus. Animportantexpression ofthisequalityisthehiring of financial officers, whose very jobs are to ensure thefirm secures outside finance on the most advantageous terms possible. Thesocialrelationsdefinedbylendingto individualsarefundamentallydifferent inmostoftheseregards.
3.2LendingtoIndividuals
Lendingto individualshasbecame a major part ofbanks' overall lending activities. Thisisevidentforthebankssurveyedhere,particularlythetoptwoUSbanks. At least two concrete factors condition the exploitative character of lending to individuals.First,therelationshipisprofoundlyunequal.Itinvolvesononehandaspecialist inmanagingmoneyflowstryingtomaximiseprofits, ontheotheranordinarywageearner trying to secure access to consumption. A range of patterns deemed 'irrational' by mainstream economic analysis follow, including the tendency for consumers to continue using thefirst card they everobtained, regardless ofitscomparativerates. 16 Also, lending ratesareoftentento20percentagepointsabovebaserates.Thehighrelativeprofitabilityof thistype ofcredit suggestshighratesofinterest do notarisefrom lowerrepayment rates. HSBC, for instance, generated 42.8 percent of its profits from lending to individuals and related feesin2006, whileallocatingonly29.4 percent ofits total assetsto suchactivities. Significant economiesofscaleincredit-scoringmethods compoundtheseeffects,reducing thescopeforcompetition. 17 Second,thescopeforexploitationthroughlendingtoindividualshasincreasedinthe past two decades.Theprivatisationofprovisionforanumberofbasicsocialnecessitieshas increasingly forced ordinary individuals into debt, transferring growing shares of their incomes to banks and other financial enterprises. The most obvious example is housing, where provision for the working classand poor has become synonymous with facilitating privateownershipthroughthedevelopmentof mortgagesecuritisationmarkets.Astable5 Anothersignificantitem iseducation, wheregrowingcostshaveincreasinglyfallendirectly on individual studentsandtheir families acrossa rangeof countries. Thishasopenedyet anotheravenuefordirectexploitationbybanks.In2006,Citibank reportedUS$220million inprofitsfromitsUSstudentloansdivisionalone.
Credit cards areanother important part of this lending. And herebanks in theUS moved aggressively to concentrate the industry as it grew in size and profitability in the 1990s. In 1995theyheldnomorethan 25percent ofcreditcardreceivablesintheUS. 19 As lateas1999,thetoptenUSissuerscontrolled55percentofthemarket;manyofthemwere independent credit card companies. 20 Since then large banks bought their way into dominant market share, acquiring Associates, Bank One, British-based MBNA, and Providian.After2004,thetoptenUSissuerscontrolledover90percent ofthemarket,and countedonlyoneindependent,non-bankenterprise. 21 The broader significance of this orientation to individual lending cannot be overstated.IntheUS,againstabackgroundofstagnantrealwages,thefinancialobligations of households is estimated to have increased from 15.36 to 19.35 percent of disposable incomebetween1980and2007. 22 Thevolumeoftransfersfrom householdstothefinancial sector on this account is unprecedented. And as the current financial crisis shows, this lendinghasintroducedadistinct,newsourceofinstabilitytofinancialmarkets.
3.3MoneyDealingFees
Banks have always earned income from the plain handling of money, such as operating the payments system, transmitting money abroad and undertaking foreign exchangetransactions.Banksaremoney-dealers, orcommercialenterprisesthat specialize in managing moneyflowsand hoards. 23 Money dealing and account relatedfees are very important sources of income for contemporary banks. They have also generated considerable controversy, including in Britain, where the Office of Fair Trading has for a numberofyearsbeentryingto curboverdraftandrelatedbank feeswidelyperceivedtobe excessive and opaque. The figures for fee incomefrom card and account services for the surveyedbankstelltheirownstory,particularlyforBankofAmericaandBritishbanks. 25 Shareholderscan be reassured that the ensuinglossesin revenue were at least partially made up for with growth in Barclaycardinternational.SeeBarclays2008,p30.
newfacilities, andtheir introductionisyet to translate into reductions inoverhead costs. Bankclientshavebecomeheavyusersofthenewtechnologies,increasinglyusingcardsand making frequentATM withdrawalsto accessconsumption. 26 Growing money-dealing fees, thus, mayin part amount to payments by ultimateusers ofnew, expensive, technologies. Buttheirpersistenceandopacity,themagnitudesinvolved,andtheirintrusionintothevery processofconsumptionsuggestthepresenceofexploitativeelementsinthem.
Whilefurtherresearchisnecessaryonthisparticularaccount,itisclearthatinboth lending and money-dealing services banks have reoriented to private wage income as a source of revenues. The resulting relations contain important exploitative elements. Significant as the resulting profits are, they do not exhaust the current scope for bank appropriationofwageearnings. Thegrowing scopeoffinancial marketmediation activities haveaffordedbanksadditional avenuesforbank profitsgroundedonwages.The nexttwo sectionsturntothoseactivitiesandthesocialcontentofcontemporarycapitalmarkets.
4.FinancialMarketMediation
Facilitating access to capital markets has emerged as an important activity for commercial banks over the past twenty years. As Theviewmotivatedin the nexttwo sectionsisthat, throughthese functions, banks appropriatefractionsofexistingloanablemoneycapital ultimatelyownedbythemassofall investors.Aswithordinarylending,thesocialcharacteroftherelationshipbankshavewith capitalistclientsisfundamentallydifferentfromthat oftheirrelationshipwithretailsavers. In the current setting, there is scope for systematic mutual gains in arms-length relationships between investment banks and corporations and other financial intermediaries.Thosegainsareultimatelyfundedbyflowsofloanablemoneycapitalowned bythemassofinvestors,who areincreasinglyordinarysavers.Incontrast, therelationship betweenbanksandaverageretailinvestorsappearsinthepresentcontextasexploitative,as bankssystematicallyappropriatevaluebymediatingfutureretirementconsumption.
In orderto establish these pointsit is necessary to characterise the functioning of capital markets and the intervention in them by banks. This requires the extension of existing Marxisttheory.Nosignificant Marxistcontributionhasbeenmadeto thisanalysis in the hundredyears since Hilferding's1910 seminal work. And despiteitsmany insights, FinanceCapital presentsproblemsinitsapproachtotheconcept offounder'sprofitaswell asinthecontemporaryrelevanceofitscoreconceptoffinancecapital,bothofwhichlieat the heart of Hilferding's conceptualisation of the integration of corporations, capital marketsandinvestmentbanks.
Section five below offers initial analytical elements of a Marxist approach to the contemporaryformofthosesocialrelations.Beforethat,thissectiondocumentstherelative importanceofrevenuesfrom fundmanagement, proprietary gains, and derivativestrading fortopinternationalbanks.
4.1FundManagement
Asalreadymentioned,managedfundsheldatotalofUS$63.8 trillioninassetsat the endof2006. Even small management feesonsuch volumescan leadto appropriations of very large volumes of loanablemoneycapital.In the US alone, mutual fund management feeshavegrownconsiderablysince1980. Source:InvestmentCompanyInstitute IntheUS,investmentbanksandbrokeragehouseswerethefirstfirmsto profitfrom the new mass retail investment funds. In 1980, the top ten New York investment banks earnedless than one percent oftheirrevenues from asset management fees.By 2004,top investment banks earned 7.5 percent of their revenues from such fees. 27 After the 1988 partial relaxation ofGlassSteagall restrictions,UScommercial banks were offeringmutual fund shares, albeit selling them for an "administrative fee" and not an "underwriting commission" or"brokeragefee". 28 In1989, commercial banks alreadyhad7percent of US mutual fund assets under their management. By 1995 this had risen to 15 percent. 29 Worldwide, thenine banks surveyedandtheirfinancial group partners controlled at least 10.2percent oftheentiremanagedfundmarketin2006, ashareonparwiththecombined totalforinvestmentbanksUBS,CreditSuisse,JPMorgan,GoldmanSachs,andDeutsche. 30 Theimportanceoftheseactivitiesisevidentinthebanks'revenuefigures. The revenue share is broadly higher for banks operating in Europe, where banks and insurancecompaniesoverwhelminglycontrolthemarket.Independentfundsstill maintain asignificantmarketshareintheUS. 31 Mutual fund holdings, at least in the US, are widespread among middle-class professionals as well as ordinary working-class wage earners. As of 2006, 53 percent of households owning mutual fund shares had a total annual income below US$75,000; 28 percent earned less than the median of approximately US$50,000. 32 The attraction of mutualfundsforsmallholdersofloanablemoneycapital,forwhomdirectaccesstocapital markets is too costly, time-consuming, or complicated, isaccessto rates ofreturn higher than those available through commercial bank deposits or mostly safe government securities.Yetthesocialrealitiesoftherelationshipcannotbeescaped.Retailinvestorsare various types of wage earners approaching it on the basis of securing future (typically retirement)consumption.Fundmanagersarewell-connectedfinancialprofessionalsseeking tomaximiseprofits.
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Theresultsarestartling.TheEconomist (1March,2008)hasreportedonresearchby topUSfundmanagementfirmVanguardshowingthatbetween1980 and2005theS&P500 share index returned12.3 percent per yearon average. Over thesameperiod, theaverage equitymutualfundyieldedonly10percent.Theaverageinvestorgainedonly7.3percenton averageperyear, largelydueto thestrongtendencyofretail investorsto buyhighandsell low.Thereturnrealisedbytheaverageequitymutualfundinvestorisnotmuchhigherthan rates available forlong-term savingsdeposits. Overthesameperiod,US six-month T-bills yieldedan average 6.00 percent, whileUS municipal and local government 20-yearbonds yieldedanaverage6.92percent. 33 Thesignificanceofthesedifferencescanbeillustratedbyconsidering ahypothetical investment of $100 madein 1980. 34 If it wereinvestedin safeT-bills, by 2005the investor wouldhold$454.94.Incontrast,haditbeeninvestedinS&Pindexsecurities,itwouldhave grown to $2041.14. Thetotal premium forinvesting in equity over T-bills overthis period stood,thus,at$1559.20.Nowconsiderawageearnerhopingtosaveforretirementwhotried to take advantage of those potential gains by investing $100 in an equity mutual fund in 1980. Earning only the average return received by equity mutual fund investors overthis period, herinvestment would have only grown to $624.59by 2005. This representsa gain overthesafeT-bill investmentof$169.65,oramere10.9percent ofthetotalpotentialgains fromequityinvestment! Theremaining89.1percentwereappropriatedbyfundmanagersandotherfinancial market firms. This includes appropriation through commissions and fees on investment funds as well as the trading and proprietary gains discussed below. Unsurprisingly fund managementisremarkablyprofitable. In an internationalsurveyofmoneyfundmanagers' performanceintheleanyearof2002, 35 BostonConsultingGroup2003foundthat64percent ofthefundsreportedpre-taxprofitmarginsabove20 percent.Afull42percentofthefunds reported profit margins higher than 30 percent. Funds targeting retail investors were reportedlythemostprofitable. 36 Although the thought experiment pursued here is no substitute for more comprehensiveempiricalstudy,itsresultssuggest theseactivitieshaveastrongexploitative element,particularlygiventhehighprofitabilityoffundmanagement.Byprovidingpension savings services that used to be provided by the state, fund managers mediate future consumption andappropriateloanablemoney capital originatinginthewagesofordinary retailinvestors.Asdiscussedinsection5below,thebasesforthesesystematicflowsofvalue arisingin thesphereofexchangeincapital marketsultimatelylieinthefundamental class differences between retail investors on one hand, and banks and corporate managers on another.
4.2ProprietaryTrading
Commissions and fees from fund management are only one of the ways in which banks performing investment banking and fund management services can profit at the expense of investors, particularly retail ones. Investment banking and fund management activities naturally pose opportunities for banks to make capital gains on securities. Underwriting requires banks to make investments in the securities being issued. Brokers oftenstandinascounterpartyforclienttransactionswithvolumesthatcouldaltermarket prices, in which case banks charge clients a margin on the security's current price. And banks increasingly invest in the companies they advise, on which they have intimate
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33 CalculatedwithmonthlydatafromFederalReserve'sSelectedInterestRates. 34 Assumingeachinstrumentpaiditsaverageannualreturnovertheperiodeveryyear. 35 Includingsevenofthetopten fundmanagersbyasset, plusanother 33whocollectivelycontrolledover one-fifth ofthe worldmarket. knowledge. 37 Finally, when retail investorsbuyhigh andsell low, the counterparty to the transaction is the bank's trading account. To the extent that the bank possesses better knowledge about capital markets and has the financial clout to withstand and take advantageofevenmoderatedownturns,itwillprofithandsomelyfromsuchtransactions. This is a controversial issue, asit is rightly perceived to pose potential conflicts of interestbetweenthebankandits clients,andto befertilegroundforthemanipulation of markets at theexpenseof otherinvestors. 38 Banks aregenerally reluctantto report which transactionsare carried out forclientsandwhichare carried ona principal basis.Further complicating matters, thistypeofgaincan accruenot onlyon listed owninvestment, but also on securitiesheld fortrading as part of brokerage services forboth institutional and retail clients. Thecombined figuresfor gainson those accounts gives agood senseof the importanceofthistypeofrevenueforcommercialbanks. centrallyinUS markets, themainimpactonthesebankstook placethroughtheirtradingaccountholdingsofsub-primemortgageCDOs.The2007tradingaccountlossesincreditor structured products for Citigroup, Bank of America and Dresdner stood at US$ 21.806 billion,5.176billion,and468million,respectively.Whilepostingnetoveralltradingaccount gains, RBS, Barclays, and HSBC registered net trading losses in credit instruments amounting to US$2.861 billion, 823 million, and 419 million. Some of these losses were associated with holdings for trading, as these banks mediated purchases by many hedge funds investing in sub-prime mortgage CDOs. 40 But the sheer volume of losses suggests theseholdingswere to a significantextentproprietaryinthat they weremotivatedbythe hopeofreturnsonholdingtheseassets.
Table10 OwnandTradingAccountGains
4.3Derivatives
Investment and commercial banks have engaged heavily in issuing, trading, and market-making forderivative assets.Marketsforover-the-counter(OTC) interest-rateand foreign-exchange derivatives have grown tremendously in the past twentyyears, reaching almost US$400 trillionin notional amountsoutstanding inJuneof 2007, according to the Bank for International Settlements. Although insignificant as recently as the end of last century,thevolumeofcreditdefaultswapshasalsoincreaseddramaticallyinthepastseven years. 43 Insurance companies, investment and hedge funds regularly acquire derivative assets from dealers in order to conform their positions with the expectations and requirements of customers and regulators. Gains made from these improvements provide the foundation for payments of fees for obtaining derivative contracts.Itshouldbenotedherethat themostimportant functionofaderivativeasset in
Table11
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42 The InternationalSwapsand DerivativesAssociation reportswell over 90 percent of the world'stop500corporations regularlyuseover-the-counterderivatives. thisconnection isnot necessarilyto change the prospects ofthe buyer, but to changethe perceptionofthoseprospectsbyothercapitalmarketplayers. 44 Whether bought for hedging or pure speculation, derivative assets yield fees to issuingbanks.Likegoodbookies,issuersgenerallymaintainaneutralpositiontoeitherside of all markets. Issuance fees represent various appropriations of existing loanable money capital, centrally from institutional investors drawing funds from the mass of retail investors. As such, bank profits from this issuance also represent systematic transfers of valuefromthemassofretailinvestorstothefinancialsector.
5.CapitalMarkets,InvestmentBankingandMarxistTheory
Theincreasingsignificanceoffinancialmarketmediationtocapitalismingeneraland for commercial banks in particular poses a considerable analytical challenge for Marxist politicaleconomy.Theseactivitiescanbehighlycomplex,andmanyofthemarehistorically novel. Identifying their social content requires development and extension of Marxist theory.
BuildingonMarx1909,Hilferding1981offersthebestdevelopedMarxistapproachto capitalmarkets.Yetdespiteitsimportantinsights,thebook'sapproachtotheintegrationof corporations, banksand capital markets isdefined bythe concepts offinance capital and founder's profit. Subsequent developments in capitalism have pointed to empirical and analytical weaknesses in both concepts. As the discussion above suggests, contemporary capitalismisnotcharacterisedbythemergerofbankingandindustrialcapital.
Theconceptoffounder'sprofit,asformulatedbyHilferding,alsoposesdifficulties.It refers to apeculiar capital gain realisedbyacorporation'sfounders when equity isissued and sold because buyers expect and receive only the basicrateof interest as a return on theirinvestment.InthishefollowedverycloselyonthestepsofMarx,forwhom therateof interest represented the general mode of appropriation for all holders of money capital, regardlessoftheinstrumentsemployed.
Yet historically, expectedandrealisedequityreturnshaveexceededreturnson bills andbondsoverlongperiodsoftime. 45 Moreimportantly,this viewmakes itimpossibleto characterisethesocial content ofrelations definedbyinvestment bankingactivities. 46 Put most simply, if corporations can directly raise capital at the rate of interest, there is no reason for them to engage the costly services of investment banks and little content to financialmarketmediation.
Startingfromtheseappreciations,andthemost general andcompellingfoundations of Hilferding's approach to capital markets, this section aims to make a modest and preliminary contribution to aMarxist theorisation of capital markets, investment banking and financial market mediation. The discussion affords a general characterisation of the
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44 Millo and MacKenzie 2007 eloquently emphasise this aspect of derivative markets, particularly in relation to the prevalenceofpricingmodelsbased on the basicmodelsof Blackand Scholes1973and Merton1973 whosemathematical foundationsyieldeasilyauthoritativeprices,regardlessoftheirempiricalpurchaseonreality. 45 Awideliteraturedocumentsthesuperior returnson equityover bondsinthe USthroughout thetwentieth century. In the post-war period,USequityreturnshaveyieldedanaverageexcessreturnof5.5percentover bills (DeLongandMagin, 2007) . Besser 1999also presentsevidence fromGermany between1870to 1995 showing that equity returns, while highly volatile,havebeenconsistentlyhigherthanbondreturnsoverlonginvestmenthorizons. social necessity andinherentcontradictionsof capital marketsandinvestment banking in capitalism,aswellasanelucidationoftheirparasiticclasscontentintheconcretehistorical settingprevalentsincetheearly1980s.
5.1CapitalMarkets,RiskandInvestmentBanking
Capital markets aremarkets for securities:rights to different futurecashflows paid bycorporations.In thefirst instance, corporationsentercapital marketsto raise fundsfor investment. Loanable moneycapital enterscapital marketsseeking self-expansion through thefuturecashflowsassociatedwithsecuritiesandpossiblecapitalgains.Twobroadtypes ofsecuritiesaretraded,bondsandequity.Bondsaredebtclaimsandholdersareentitledto the payment of interest. Equity represents a claim on residual profits of enterprise in the formofdividends;itmayalso legallyrepresentvotingrightsat corporatemeetings.Capital gains may be realised on any security when a holder sells it for a price higher than its purchaseprice.
Capital markets effect a socialisation sui generis of debt and of capital itself, with potentialbenefitsforthecapitalistclassasawhole.Inthepurchaseofanynon-marketable enterprise liability, the value advanced by the buyer loses the flexibility and general acceptability it had when it was in the form of loanable money capital. Loanable money capital is transformed into commodities in the enterprise's circuit of capital, and its transformationinto morevaluehingesonthevicissitudesofthatcircuitovertime.Thisloss of liquidity can be ameliorated through developed capital markets. Liquid markets for corporatesecuritiesallowsecurityholdersreadilyto realisevalueintomoney, whichisnot onlythe most flexible, independent and sociallyrecognisedembodiment ofvalue, but the verypurposeoftheadvanceofloanablemoneycapital.Increasedliquiditywillattractlarger volumes of money seeking a security, generally reducing the cost of outside finance.
Bonds and equity give holders rights to uncertain future flows of money. As with ordinaryloans,theirpricesareirrational from theperspectiveofMarxistpoliticaleconomy in that they are money expressions of the value of future money. Prices are determined unanchored, through the competitive interaction of supply and demand. In the capitalist setting of competitive individual appropriation, this relative detachment poses a range of difficulties, including problems of trust and confidence between parties in a setting of anarchicuncertaintyabouttheeconomicfuture.
It is in relation to these difficulties that corporate 'financial engineering' and investmentbankingacquiresocialsignificancebypossiblyassistingacorporationto reduce itsfinancing costsorgenerate capital gains. Ingeneral, all developments that increasethe profitability of an enterprisewill also increase equity prices-higherrates ofexploitation, leadershipintheinstallationofnewtechniquesofproduction,increasedcontrolofmarkets,&c.
But the detachment of capital-market prices from underlying realities of accumulationcreatesotherpotential sourcesofcapitalgains(orlosses)thathaveno direct relationship to underlying real investments or profitability. A generalised expectation of futuresecuritypriceriseswill ofteninitselfincreasedemand,leadingto furtherpricerises that for some time yield considerable profits and appear to validate expectations. Sheer manipulation, including by investment banks, has often been an integral part of such processes.Capitalmarketsandinvestmentbankinginherentlycreatethepossibilityofsuch speculativebubblesandtheirdevastatingconsequences. 47 Yet capital markets also create a systematic foundation for investment banking functions and profits that does not by itself involve swindles, bubbles or manipulation: potential improvements to the social perceptions of the risks associated with the selfexpansion of value through a particular corporate security. These may lower the cost of raisingcapitalandgeneratecapitalgainsthatsustaininvestment-bankingfeesandprofits.
As generally noted by Hilferding, 48 investors' perceptions of risks associated with security returns play a defining role in the demand for securities. Specifically, security buyers will try to assess the potential problems posed by its future cash flows and its reconversionintomoney.Thustheperceivedcreditworthinessandliquidityofasecurityare centraldeterminantsofdemand.
The less creditworthy or liquid a security is perceived to be, ceteris paribus, the smaller demand for it will be. Resulting security prices will be lower, and the expected future cash flows accruing to holders will represent a higher yield on initial investment. Similarly, two securities with different expected potential future cash flows, but with the sameperceivedcreditworthinessandliquidity,will seetheirpresent pricesmoveuntil both yieldthesameexpectedreturn.Asaresult,systematic'riskpremia'ariseincapitalmarkets: ageneralpositiveassociationbetweenexpectedreturnsonasecurityandtheperceivedrisks totheselfexpansionofloanablemoneycapitalitposes.
Thepotentialbenefitsofinvestmentbankingoperationsinthisregardaremostclear when considering the issue of a new corporate security. Neither its liquidity nor its creditworthinesscanbeguaranteedapriori.Investmentbankshelpredressthissituationin thefirstinstancethroughunderwriting.Theycommittobuythenewsecurityataparticular price, assuring buyers of its ready reconversion into money and signaling the bank's confidenceinitscreditworthiness.
As argued and historically illustrated by Morrison and Wilhelm 2007 , investment banks are able to do this given their position and relations within social and business networksofcorporatemanagers,individual investors,andmanagersofinstitutional funds. On the security selling side, the banks are responsible for 'due diligence' on the issuer's conditions, makinguseoftheirspecialisationin credit enhancement.Onthe buying side, thebankengagesinongoingconsultationswithanetwork ofcloseprivateandinstitutional investors, gathering knowledge of prices those buyers would pay for the issue, and any aspectsoftheissueandissuertheymaywishto seechanged.Buyersagreetodiscussthese issues with the bank on the understanding they will beoffered preferential accessto the resulting security issue. Banks also advise corporations on a range of issue-related and broadercorporate-financemattersthatmayimprovemarketperceptionsofacorporation's securities. This often includes advising on the management of total security supply, or sellingderivativeassetstoreduceperceptionsofrisksassociatedwiththeissuer.
All insiders generallygain as aresult of these activities.The initial buyers, who are individualorinstitutionalclientsofthebank,getafirstshotatbuyingsecuritiesthat,ifthe bank has doneitsjobwell, will likelyappreciate significantly in theshort run. The issuer facesalowercostofcapital.Andthebankreceivesfees,typicallyintheformofadiscounted priceontheissuedsecurityinrelationtotheofferprice. 49 Corporatemanagersandinvestmentbanksmayalsotrytogeneratecapital gainson oldissuesofequitybyemployingsimilarmethods.Whetherthesecuritiesareneworold,all such gains are funded from the loanable money capital of outside buyers. Those buyers accept highersecurity prices becausetheycome to perceivebetterpospectsorfewerrisks associatedwithownershipofthesecurityinquestion.
The uncertainty, competitiveness and relative detachment of capital-market operations ensuretheyare directly shapedbyhistoricallyconcrete social conventionsand sustainedpracticesamongmarketparticipants. 50 Thisincludesperceptionsaboutsecurities, whichmaybegenerallysharedandsustaintransactionsevenwhileatconsiderablevariance fromtherealitiesunderpinningthevalueofsecurities. 51 Thisgivesrisenotonlytopotential instability, butalso to possiblesystematicadvantagesto market participantsbetterableto shapeandapplycapital-marketconventionsandpractices.
5.2Bonds,Equity,andCapital-MarketReturns
Capitalmarketcompetitionimposesgeneralconstraintstopotentialgainsfromthese activities, as well as certain tendencies in the quantitative relationship between capitalmarketandreal-accumulationratesofreturn.Itisuseful to considerseparatelybondsand equityinthisregard.
Bonds embody credit relations, not fundamentally different from those created by bankloans.Theirrateofreturnisarateofinterest,whichisasharingofprofits.Itslevelwill dependonthequantityandcharacteristicsofotherbonds,therelativeperceivedriskofthe individual bond, andtheamountofloanablemoneycapitalseekingself-expansioninbond markets. Private bonds ordinarily pay higher interest yields than state paper regarded as safe. Bond rates are typically measured as premia above returns on state bonds. 52 The expectedrateofreturnonabondeffectivelydemandedbybuyersmayaccountforexpected capital gains on the bond. Those could arise as the relative riskinessof the corporation's debt falls,orasoverall demandforbondsincreases. Theseareunlikelyto besystematicas the management of corporations will not generally tryspecifically to increase theprice of outstandingbonds.
Equity possesses a distinct relationship to the process of accumulation, returns realised through dividend payments and capital gains. Equity capital (in Marx's words, 'fictitious capital') does not represent an aliquot of real circulating capital. It entitles the holderto apro-rataclaimonfuturestreamsofdividendsdrawingontheprofitsgenerated by the circulation of capital. This is clear from the divergence of a corporation's market capitalisation and net asset values. Capital engaged in industrial or merchant circuits
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49 ChenandRitter2000reportthisdiscountisusuallyaroundsevenpercentofthelistedprice. 50 SeeMacKenzie2003,forinstance. 51 The current crisishasexposeda rangeofsuchcasesin the credit-scoringmodelsusedinmortgage lending, and inthe estimation offuturecash flowsassociated withmortgage-backedCDOs. The methodsusedwereadequate for convincing successive layers of security buyers, but not for actually describing the objective characteristics of the security. See LapavitsasanddosSantos2008.
52 Theexistenceofa large, liquidmarketforstate securitiesgenerallydeemedasrisk-free isan importantunderpinningin the development ofliquid private bondmarkets.Therisein volumesofprivatemarketabledebt sincethe early 1980swas accompaniedby anequally impressiveriseinthe volumeofoutstandingmarketableUSTreasury bonds,notesandbills. Thoserosefromjustover20percentofGDPin1980,toalmost45percentby1997.
appreciatesthroughtherateofprofit,establishedthroughmediationsinvolvingstrugglesat the point of production, the composition ofcapital, and competition in input and output markets. Equity capital appreciates according to the rate of return, established through competitionincapitalmarkets.Whilerelated,eachoftheseratesrepresentsfundamentally differentsocialrelations.
At purchase, the expected rateofreturn ona corporation's equity will generallybe higherthantherateofinterestonitsbonds.Debtrepaymentisgenerallymoresecurethan residual gainsonequity.Inthisimportantregardthepositionarticulatedherediffersfrom thatofferedbyHilferding,who arguedthatcompetitionamongbuyersofequitywouldtake returns on equity down to the rate of interest. Hilferding understood quite well the existence of risk premia across different securities. But in his approach to capital market securities he followed closely on Marx's own exposition in Chapter 23 of Volume III of Capital on the returns to loanable money capital. 53 And while Marx's exposition on the matterelucidatestheobjectivefoundationofinterestpaymentsinthegenerationofprofits by real capital, it also advances the rate of interest as the general return on all loanable moneycapital,regardlessofthefinancialandsocialrelationshipbetweenthebuyerandthe seller or the typeofsecurity in question. It is impossible to approach risk premia, which inherentlyinvolveindividualsecuritiesandtheirreturns,onsuchabasis. Therateofreturnexpectedbynewbuyersofequitywilldependontheirperceptions of present profitability, theirconfidence inthesecurity,aswell asontheirexpectations of the future evolution of these factors. 54 Investment banking and 'financial engineering' operations can affect these perceptions and expectations, reducing the expected rate of returndemandedbynewequitybuyers,andthusgeneratingpricerisesandcapitalgainsfor incumbentowners.
The scope for gains from such activities will generally depend on the evolution of demandforsecuritiesinrelationtosupply,andonthecapacityofcorporatemanagersand investment bankers to devise ways to increasethe confidence in thesecurity by potential buyers.Thiswillhingeonhistoricallyspecificpracticesandconventionsthathaveacquired general acceptance in shaping capital-market perceptions, 55 as well as on the specific compositionofinvestorsseekingtomakegainsfromsecurities.
The steady privatisation of pension provision and other necessities since the early 1980screatedauniquesetting incapital markets.Itnot only greatlyincreased demandfor securities,but also addedagrowingmassofordinarysaversonto capitalmarkets.Theclass implications have been dramatic. On one side we have seen corporate managers and investmentbankersnestledinextensivesocialandbusinessnetworksofcapitalistinvestors andmanagers,organisedprofessionallywith the explicit purposeofmaximising returnsby shaping market perceptions. On the other side, we have seen atomised individual savers whose engagement with capital markets is primarily dictated by trying to access consumption-retirement,achild'seducation,adownpaymentonahouse,&c.
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53 IowethisimportantobservationontheoriginsofHilferding'sapproachtoMakotoItoh. 54 Earlier versionsofthisarticleconsideredthe simple caseofequityissued bya corporation not expected toexperience capital gainsandpayingout allprofitsasdividends. Inthatcase, expected returnsonequity willnotnormallybe higher thanthecorporation'srateofprofit. Otherwise,market capitalisation would typicallybemuchlower thanthe priceofthe corporation'sassets.Eventually,either thecorporation willbuy backcheapequity,oritwillbe boughtupandreorganised orliquidated.Eitherway,thesituationisunlikelytolastverylong.
It should not be surprising that the results of this encounter have proven systematically unfavourable to retail savers. The relative detachment of capital-market operations from underlyingrealities of production, andtheirsusceptibility to perceptions, conventions and-more recently-highly technical practices, tend to favour the wellconnectedcapitalistrelativetoretailsavers.Thedramaticallydifferentoutcomesofcapitalmarket trading for retail investors and for financial intermediaries are not usefully understood as the product of the 'irrationality' of retail investors. After all, financial intermediarieshaveamply proventheir owncapacity for 'irrationality'.Systematicuneven capital-market outcomes are simply an expression of the class content of contemporary capitalmarkets.
Whilemore analytical and empirical work areneededin this regard, itisclearthat the foundation of the recent astronomical profits associated with investment banking activitieshaveultimatelybeenfundedfrom theinvestmentsofordinarysavers.Inasetting where these activities have not been generally associated with securing increased real investment-whichcouldleadtogeneralincreasesinproductivity,wages,andstandardsof living-in investment banking during this period appears as monumental and crystalised classparasitism.
6.SomeConcludingObservations
A number of secular, policy and technological developments have fundamentally changedbankinganditsrelationshiptoaccumulation.ParticularlyintheUS,non-financial corporations have become less reliant on outside finance in general and bank loans in particular for their operational investments. Their relationship with capital markets has consequently changed, and to a significant extent consists of "financial engineering" operations aimed at capital gains and involving the withdrawal of equity and bond borrowings.Theprivatisationofpensionsprovisionhasfacilitatedthischangebytriggering unprecedented inflows of loanable money capital into capital markets in the form of retirement savings. Bankshave placedthemselvesat theheart oftheseprocesses, offering mutually beneficial, arms-length investment-banking services to corporations. They have also pursuedtheprovision ofvariousinvestment fundinstrumentsto ordinarysavers, who systematicallyreceiveveryunfavourabletermsinthoseservices. Thesteadyprivatisationoftheprovisionofagrowingnumberofsocialnecessitieshas also made access to money a precondition for the basic reproduction of ordinary wage earners.Particularlyinasettingofstagnant real wagesandrisingsocialinequality,thishas forced wage earners onto financial markets to secure mortgage, education and consumer credit as well as private insurance services. The relationships banks establish with them through those activities involve large and systematic appropriations of value drawing on individual income. As such, they are exploitative. While these changes are most clearly pronouncedintheUSandBritain,themicro-levelevidencediscussedinthispapersuggests the new banking practices are spreading, distinctively, to other advanced capitalist economies.
The current financial crisis may be usefully understood as a crisis of this type of banking and attendant financial activities. Regulatory arbitrage and rising degrees of leveraging of financial intermediaries have played important roles in the crisis. Positivist hubrisaboutthepowerofnew,inference-basedestimationsofriskalsoplayedtheirpart,as capital market players came to believe that derivative assets and their inference-based pricing formulas could actually describe and account for all market eventualities. And competitionamongintermediariesensuredthateventhoughmanyofthemknewsub-prime mortgagelending was going to leadto losses, they couldhardly affordto missout on the boom. 56 Toborrowfrom formerCitigroupbossChuckPrinceIII,whenthemusicstopped, mostbankswerecaughtdancing.
Yet underpinning all ofthese factors was thedriveby banks and broader financial system to increasethescopeforfinancial expropriation.Unsurprisingly, problems aroseas this expansion started to include historically oppressed layers of the US population with verylowandinsecurewageincomes. Theunfolding economicdepressionis adding to the system'sproblemsasincreasingvolumesof'prime' mortgagesandotherconsumerdebtgo bad.
It was contemporary banking created thecurrent financial crisis andis responsible for the consequent devastation of the lives of millions of people. It is also central to contemporarycapitalism. Whateverhappens over thenext period,itisunlikelythat bank appropriationofvalueattheexpenseofordinarywageearnerswillcollapsebythepowerof itsowncontradictions.Therevenueshavebeenfartoo significant,andthebeneficiariesfar too central to thesocio-political fabricofthedifferent advancedcapitalist economies. The weakening oftradeunionandofbroadersocial organisations of ordinarypeople overthe past thirtyyearsfacilitatedthegrowing intrusion ofthefinancial system into theeveryday lives of ordinary wage earners. It isthe reawakening ofthoseorganisations that can once again place on the agenda the social provision for housing, retirement, education, health andothernecessities,aswell asthebroaderdesirabilityofconscious,democraticeconomic planning.
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56 HSBC2007,p8, notedinMarch 2007 thatmuch ofitsUSsub-primemortgage portfolio had"evidencedmuch higher delinquencythanhadbeenbuiltintothepricingoftheseproducts".Despitepromisestoshareholdersof"restructuringthis businessto avoid any repetition of the risk concentration that built up", the bank reported lossesof US$ 1.8 billion in consumerlendingandUS$1.2billionininvestmentbankingfortheUSoperationsoneyearlater.
AppendixonBankCorporateReports
Unless otherwise noted, all information concerning individual banks was obtained from theirrespectiveAnnual Reports for 2006 and 2007. Theonlyexception isSMFC, for whichthereportforfiscal 2006-07wasused.Giventhesignificant accountingconventions across national regulators andindividual institutions,itis necessaryto specifythesources for particular data reported above. This is done by reported area of activity in the explanationsbelow,whichalsoincludepertinentcaveatsanddifficulties.
CreditcardandAccountServiceCharges Forallbanks,thesearefeesfrom creditandbankingcards,andaccount services.ForRBS, total non-interest income from retail operations is provided, which includes fund management fees. ForBNP Paribas net commission income not measuredat fairvalue is given,whichisaresidualestimateofmoney-dealingcommissionandfees.
FinancialMarketMediation
The percentages are an understatement for SMFG and RBS, neither of which reported separate fund management revenues. SMFG does not report narrow investment banking revenueseither.Thefiguregivenisexclusivelyforgainsonownandtradingaccount.
FundManagementandRelatedCommissionFees
Thefigures relateto netfeesandorcommissionson management ofinvestment, pension, mutualandotherfunds.TheexceptionsareCitgroup,forwhichnetincomeofSmithBarney and Private Banking divisions is given, and RBS for which fees earned at retail level are given,whichalsoincludemoney-dealingfees.
OwnandTradingAccountGains
ForHSBC thefigures are thesum of "Net trading incomeand Net incomefrom financial instruments". For Citibank, they relate to "Principal transactions" total revenue (the reported loss for credit instrument tallied at US$ 21.8 billion). For Bank of America and SMFG, they correspond to "Trading account profits" plus equity investment income and gainson salesofdebtsecurities. Thebank'stradingaccount lossfor2007stoodat US$ 5.13 bilion. The figures for RBS include net gains from trading plus gains from investments, asset-backedactivities,andrental.ThefiguresforBarclaysarefrom"Principaltransactions" and include net trading and investment incomes. Santander's "resultados netos de operaciones financieras" are reported. Paribas reports prominently on its net gains on financial instrumentsatfairvalueandon available-for-salefinancialassets. Thefiguresfor UBSandGoldmanSachsare,respectively,fornettradingincomeandtradingandprincipal investmentsincome.
